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The problem of knowledge representation has been central to recent 
work in artificial intelligence and cognitive psychology. In AI, resear- 
chers have been concerned to find a way of representing knowledge 1 
for efficient use by computers. Psychologists have been struck by the 
difficulty of accounting for the ability of human beings to store and 
retrieve large amounts of information. In both these fields, emphasis has 
been placed on new kinds of "knowledge structures," which are more 
complex than propositions and are intended to provide a more effective 
means of representing and processing information. The most commonly 
used terms for such knowledge structures are "frame," "schema," and 
"script." 
This paper is intended to acquaint philosophers with the new 
approach to knowledge representation, and to provide a preliminary 
assessment of the epistemological significance of frames and other 
processing notions. In section 1, I argue for a framework in which, 
contrary to the views of Frege and Popper, psychological investigations 
can be highly relevant to epistemology. This clears the way for 
exposition in 2 of the notion of a frame and its place in AI research. 
Then in 3, I describe the allied psychological notion of a schema and 
review the empirical applications which psychologists have found for it. 
Sections 4 and 5 contain two epistemological applications of the 
frame/schema notion: the first concerns methodological conservatism 
arising from the procedural character of frame systems, and the second 
concerns the significance of default reasoning and the relative unim- 
portance of consistency as a property of knowledge systems. 
. 
Epistemology, as I see it, is the theory of the structure and growth of 
knowledge. Its two central questions concern how knowledge is 
organized and how it can be increased. The standard philosophical 
answer to the first question is that knowledge consists of propositions. 
This goes hand in hand with the typical answer to the second question, 
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which is that knowledge primarily grows by increasing the number of 
propositions known through inference, wherein a new proposition is 
inferred from a set of old ones. 2 
If the cognitive sciences offer a revision of standard views of the 
structure and growth of knowledge, one would expect those views to 
have immediate epistemological significance. But consider the follow- 
ing argument, which is akin to ones offered by Frege (1893) and Popper 
(1972). Epistemology, the argument runs, is as unconcerned with 
psychology as is logic. Psychology describes what inferences people do 
make, but logic is concerned with what inferences people should make. 
Similarly, epistemology is the normative theory of objective know- 
ledge, and need not take into account what psychology determines to 
be the nature of the belief systems in individuals. Propositions, or rather 
sentences expressing them, can be conclusions of arguments and can be 
written down in books for public scrutiny. To examine the structure of 
individual belief systems would be only to encourage a kind of 
subjectivism which abandons the traditional noble concerns of epis- 
temology - justification and truth - for a vapid relativism. 
However, a concern with psychology need not engender epis- 
temological skepticism. Haack (1978) recommends a weak psy- 
chologism, according to which logic is prescriptive of mental processes. 
This position is distinguished from both anti-psychologism, which is the 
Frege/Popper view that logic has nothing to do with mental processes, 
and strong psychologism, the view that logic is descriptive as well as 
prescriptive of mental processes. Weak psychologism uses empirical 
psychology as a starting point, since it presupposes an empirical 
account of what mental processes to be prescriptive about, but goes 
beyond mere description of actual mental processes to consider what 
sorts of inferential practices are normatively correct (Thagard, 1982a, 
Goldman 1978). Hence weak psychologism can escape the charge of 
subjectivism and relativism which is the chief motivation for resistance 
to admitting the relevance of psychology to epistemology. 3 
Knowledge should be both private and public, inhabiting the brains 
of particular thinkers, but also subject to inter-subjective com- 
munication and assessment. Weak psychologism aims to capture both 
these aspects. The real test between weak psychologism and anti- 
psychologism consists in seeing which framework can develop a 
comprehensive and rich account of human knowledge. Sections 4 and 
F R A M E S ,  K N O W L E D G E ,  A N D  I N F E R E N C E  235 
5 of this paper are attempts to describe some possible results of the 
weak psychologistic research program. 4 
. 
Thus, whether the cognitive sciences have anything to contribute to 
epistemology is a question to be determined by seeing whether empiri- 
cal questions help to generate a more powerful epistemological theory. 
I shall argue that work on knowledge representation in artificial 
intelligence and cognitive psychology can indeed make such a con- 
tribution, by suggesting new issues as well as new approaches to old 
issues. My discussion of frames and schemas makes no claim to 
bibliographical completeness; I shall merely refer to those aspects of 
the voluminous literature in each field which seem most useful in 
developing the epistemological questions which are the focus of later 
sections. 
Marvin Minsky's (1975) paper on frames has had a major impact on 
work in artificial intelligence. The strongest constraint on theorizing in 
AI is the danger of a combinatorial explosion: a procedure which 
requires exponentially increasing amounts of processing capacity will 
quickly exhaust the resources of the largest available computers. In the 
1960's, researchers in AI often used forms of representation based on 
first order predicate calculus. Inferences could be made from an initial 
data base by mechanically deriving theorems from an original set of 
sentences. The problem, however, is to produce out of the infinite set of 
possible theorems just those theorems which contain the information 
needed. A program which required the deduction of all consequences 
of a set of formulas would encounter a combinatorial explosion. Even 
without such an unrealistic requirement, enormous difficulties arise in 
determining just what deductions are to be made. More control and 
organization of knowledge is needed than is provided by a logistic 
approach. 5 
Minksy's frame notion was a vague but rich suggestion concerning 
how knowledge might be organized. He described a frame as data- 
structure consisting of a network of nodes and relations, used for 
representing a stereotypical situation. Attached to the frame is in- 
formation about how to use the frame, what to expect to happen, and 
what other frames it might be appropriate to move to in certain 
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circumstances. The frame contains a large body of richly intercon- 
nected information about a single topic, organized around typical 
observations and procedures. Minsky proposes, for example, that when 
one enters a room, one retrieves from memory a frame which represents 
a typical room, with walls at right angles, a ceiling, and a floor. Some 
aspects of the frame are fixed, but others contain terminals, which are 
slots that must be filled in by specific instances of data. These terminals 
are initially filled with "defaul t"  assignments containing information 
which is supposed until new information displaces them. If a retrieved 
frame fails to fit reality, i.e., we cannot find terminal assignments which 
closely match our frame-based expectations, then a new frame is 
elicited by means of an interframe procedure. For example, if one walks 
into a hexagonal room, an unusually complex fram e must supplant the 
frame for a rectangular room which we most frequently employ. 
But what, the philosopher will naturally demand, are frames? Are 
they really anything different from sets of propositions? Is the frame 
notion really more than a vague metaphor for organized knowledge? I 
want to answer yes to both questions, and will defend the answer at two 
levels. First, it is possible to give a precise account of a frame as a 
structure in a programming language such as LISP. Second, it is 
possible to describe empirical consequences of the supposition that 
human knowledge is organized into frame-like structures (see section 
3). 
At  the first level, we can characterize a frame as a data structure in 
LISP, the list processing language which is the programming language 
most commonly used in work in artificial intelligence. 6 The basic data 
structure in LISP is a list, for example, (FIRST SECOND). More 
elaborate lists can also be constructed containing lists: ((FIRST) 
(SECOND THIRD))  is a list containing two lists, with one and two 
elements, respectively. Programs in LISP consist of series of definitions 
of functions which perform operations on lists. An association list is a 
list of pairs; for example, we could construct an association list of names 
of people and their ages: ((PAUL 33) (NANCY 9) (ED 35)). It is 
possible, however, to have the second element in the pair be a list, too, 
for example, if the association list pairs names of people with names of 
their children: ((FRED (BILL ALICE)) (JANE (NANCY CARL))). 
Such a structure is called a nested association list. A frame is a 
particular kind of nested association list. 
A frame (in Winston and Horn, 1981) has the basic structure: 
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(FRAME-NAME 
(SLOT-NAME ( F A C E T - N A M E  (values...)) 
(FACET-NAME (values...)) 
(more facets.. .  )) 
(SLOT-NAME ( F A C E T - N A M E  (values...) ) 
(more facets...  )) 
(more slots... )) 
Each slot is an associated pair consisting of a slot-name and an 
associated list of lists, each of which is an associated pair consisting of a 
facet-name and a list of values of that facet in that slot. A frame 
minimally has one slot, one facet and one value. 
To  be more concrete,  let me describe a modest frame system called 
E A T  which I have implemented on the University of Michigan 
Amdahl.  E A T  makes inferences and answers questions about Ann 
Arbor restaurants. Among  its frames are ones which contain in- 









(VALUE (RESTAURANT)) ) 
(VALUE (ANN-ARBOR)) ) ) 
(VALUE (FAST-FOOD)) ) 
(VALUE (AMERICAN)) ) 
(VALUE (CHEAP)) ) 
(VALUE (MINIMAL)) ) 
(VALUE (FAIR)) ) ) 
Here the slots contain information about what kind of thing Macdon-  
aids is, its location, and so on. The slots include only one facet, which 
gives an actual V A L U E  for the restaurant. 
More elaborate frames are required to represent what we know about 






(VALUE (BUSINESS)) ) ) 
(RANGE (ANN-ARBOR YPSILANTI 
DETROIT)) 
(DEFAULT (ANN-ARBOR)) ) 
(RANGE (FULL-SERVICE 
FAST-FOOD CAFETERIA) ) 
(DEFAULT (FULL-SERVICE)) ) 
(RANGE (AMERICAN CHINESE 





FRENCH OTHER) ) 
(DEFAULT (AMERICAN)) ) 
(RANGE (EXPENSIVE REASONABLE 
CHEAP) ) 
(IF-NEEDED (GUESS-COST)) 
(DEFAULT (REASONABLE)) ) 
(RANGE (ATTRACTIVE PLUSH 
MINIMAL) ) 
(DEFAULT (I~flNIMAL)) ) 
(DEFAULT ((GET 'RESTAURANT' 
SCRIPT)))) 
(RANGE (EXCELLENT GOOD FAIR 
POOR) ) 
(DEFAULT (FAIR)) ) ) 
Here  there are four possible facet-names with four different sorts of 
value. The  A - K I N D - O F  slot has an actual V A L U E  as did the 
M A C D O N A L D S  frame, but  the location slot has two different facets, 
for R A N G E  and D E F A U L T .  The  R A N G E  facet  contains a list of 
values representing the range of possible locations for a restaurant, and 
the D E F A U L T  facet  has as its value the value which one would 
suppose to be the location of a given restaurant unless information were 
provided to the contrary. The  other  facet-name is 1F-NEEDED,  in the 
cost slot, and will be explained below. 
The  R E S T A U R A N T  frame is by no means intended to be a 
definition of the concept  of a restaurant. It  does not give necessary and 
sufficient conditions for something being a restaurant. The  function of 
its various slots and facets is to say what is typical of restaurants, not 
what is universally true of them. The  D E F A U L T  facets in particular 
should not be interpreted as giving universal properties of restaurants; 
defaults function rather to provide a quick and easy value when precise 
information is not available. Section 4 contains a discussion of the 
epistemology of default reasoning. 7 
The  point of all this structure is not  simply to contain a lot of 
information, which could be done just as well in a set of sentences, but  
to enable the information to be economically processed. E A T  is able to 
use the structured information in frames to make inferences about 
restaurants for which only partial information is given. T h e  A -K IN D -  
OF  slot links things and concepts into a hierarchy which makes possible 
a search procedure  which provides answers using a process analogous 
to deduct ive inference, s Suppose you ask whether Macdonalds pays 
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taxes. E A T  fails to find the answer in the M A C D O N A L D S  frame, so it 
moves up the hierarchy using the A - K I N D - O F  slot to the RES-  
T A U R A N T  frame. Again failing to find an answer, it moves to the 
BUSINESS frame, whose relevant slot is: 
(BUSINESS 
(TAX-STATUS (VALUE (PAYS-TAXES)) ) ) 
E A T  then returns the answer that Macdonalds pays taxes. A logician 
would see this as a deductive inference from the propositions that all 
restaurants are businesses, and all businesses pay taxes, and Macdonalds 
is a restaurant, but  procedurally, E A T  uses frames and slots to generate 
the appropriate answer. 
A second procedural  resource of frames derives f rom the presence of 
default values. The  slot F O O D - S T Y L E  admits a range of different 
styles of food, but  it contains as a default the value A MERICA N .  In the 
processing system, the effect of this value is that unless there is 
evidence to the contrary, it will be assumed that a given restaurant 
serves American style food, producing very economically the answer 
"Amer ican"  to a question concerning what kind of food a restaurant 
serves. Although this may seem inferentially precipitous, it establishes 
great gains in speed of information processing, and disaster is avoided 
by procedures which supercede the default value if there is any positive 
information about what style of food is to be found in a given 
restaurant. 
Defaults and inherited values are relatively immediate and in- 
expensive ways of filling in slots, requiring little complex processing. In 
some cases, we need a special procedure  to fill in a slot, and the 
incorporation of attached procedures is the third salient feature of the 
restaurant frame. The  slot for COST of restaurant contains not only a 
range of values and a default value, it includes a procedure  for 
determining the value of the slot if one is needed. The  I F - N E E D E D  
value is a specific function, GUESS-COST,  which in E A T  contains the 
rules that if the F O O D - S T Y L E  of a particular restaurant is F R E N C H ,  
then the value for COST is EXPENSIVE,  and if the value for 
S E R V I N G - S T Y L E  is FAST-FOOD,  then the value for COST is 
C H E A P .  Thus, given only the following information about Burger-  






(FAST-FOOD)) ) ) ) 
The  program uses the A - K I N D - O F  value to consult the RES- 
T A U R A N T  frame, where in the I F - N E E D E D  facet of the CO S T slot, 
it finds the function GUESS-COST,  which calculates using the value 
for S E R V I N G - S T Y L E  of B U R G E R - K I N G  that its CO S T is CH EA P .  
As with the use of inherited values, the use of the I F - N E E D E D  slot 
could be translated into a straight-forward deduct ive inference, but 
only at the expense of ignoring the actual procedural  nature of the 
inference. In addition to I F - N E E D E D  facets, other sorts of procedural  
attachments are sometimes used, but I shall neglect  their operation 
here. 
The  use of inherited, default and if-needed values and the sorts of 
inferences described will be standard to any frame system, but in E A T  I 
have also used the resources of the system to perform other  sorts of 
inferences, more  akin to what are usually classed as inductive in- 
ferences. The  implementations I will now describe are not intended to 
be optimal ways of performing analogical and other inferences, but  are 
suggestive of how such inferences might operate in a frame system. 
Suppose you have only the following information about Burger-  
King: 
(BURGER-KING 
(FOOD-STYLE (VALUE (AMERICAN)) ) 
(DECOR (VALUE (MINIMAL)) ) ) )) 
A reasonable way of inferring the cost of this restaurant would be to use 
an analogical inference, concluding that the cost of Burger-King is the 
same as the cost of the restaurant most similar to it in other  respects. 
E A T  uses a pat tern-matching procedure  to find which frame of the 
restaurants in the data base has most in common with the frame for 
B U R G E R - K I N G .  In this case, it gets the best match between the slots 
of B U R G E R - K I N G  and the slots of M A C D O N A L D S ,  therefore picks 
M A C D O N A L D S  as the analog of B U R G E R - K I N G ,  and then con- 
cludes that, like Macdonalds, Burger-King is cheapl 9 
A similar pattern matching procedure  is used by E A T  to classify 
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objects. If the A-KIND-OF slot in an objecrs frame is not filled, EAT 
can classify the object by finding the general frame whose slots best 
match those of the object's frame. For example, the BURGER-KING 
frame, in the last paragraph can be matched against the frames for 
RESTAURANT, GROCERY-STORE, and BUSINESS. EAT finds 
that the best match between the slot-names of BURGER-KING and 
the slot-names of the three general frames is with RESTAURANT, and 
therefore concludes that Burger-King is a kind of restaurant. 1° 
After an inference has been made, it would seem natural that an 
inferrer would store the new information so that if needed in the future 
it can be simply retrieved rather than have to be inferred again. EAT 
has this capability: once an inference is made about something using its 
frame, the frame is altered to include the new information. Thus, the 
BURGER-KING frame discussed in the past two examples is altered 
by the addition of new slots and values following the inference. 
Because EAT deals only with a very limited domain, it does not have 
an important general feature which Minsky proposed for frame systems. 
For most efficient use, a computer's (or a human's) frame system might 
be organized into a network of sub-systems. The frame system EAT 
would be a component of a much larger system; such sub-systems of 
frames might be called macrostructures (cf. van Dijk, 1980). A large 
frame system will need a control structure for dealing with different 
macrostructures. The existence of macrostructures can have epis- 
temological consequences which are discussed in section 4. Even within 
a macrostructure such as the one in EAT, there must be procedural 
devices for determining what sorts of inferences are made when. In its 
current form, EAT makes inferences in response to specfic questions 
put to it, but a more realistic implementation would allow it to make 
inferences more autonomously and automatically in response to less 
specific prompting. 
These general procedural capabilities, in addition to the particular 
ones we saw above (inheritance, defaults, and procedural attachments), 
should suffice to convince the reader that frames are more than thinly 
disguished sets of propositions in predicate calculus. Granted, as Hayes 
(1979) argues, the content of a frame can easily be translated into 
predicate calculus. However, this observation is irrelevant to assessing 
the significance of frames, since their potential values lie in organizing 
knowledge for the sake of more effective processing. Predicate calculus 
is not in itself a processing system at all, and the sort of processing 
242 P A U L  T H A G A R D  
system most naturally at tached to it, based on the usual rules of 
deduction, seems to many researchers in artificial intelligence to be too 
undiscriminating to serve effectively. 
The  point requires emphasis. The  information in a frame might 
instead be represented in a set of sentences or a set of formulas in 
predicate calculus. (The only difficulty would come in representing 
default values, which would require something like a modal operator  
"typically p".)  But the possible translation does not in the least diminish 
the significance of frame systems, which is largely procedural. The  key 
claim is that information can be processed much more effectively by a 
frame system than by a system based on predicate calculus. Consider, 
for example, the inference, described above, that Macdonalds pays 
taxes. In form more familiar to logicians, this inference could be 
represented: 
All businesses pay taxes 
All restaurants are businesses. 
Therefore ,  all restaurants pay taxes. 
All restaurants pay taxes. 
Macdonalds is a restaurant. 
Therefore ,  Macdonalds pays taxes. 
If the sentences in these syllogisms were formalized, it would be easy to 
prove using your favorite axiomatic or natural deduction system that the 
inferences are valid. But that is not the question we are asking, which 
concerns how the information that Macdonalds pays taxes is to be 
derived from a data base of facts about restaurants and businesses. If 
the data base were deductively closed, it would already contain the 
information that Macdonalds pays taxes, but it is computationally 
absurd to have a deduct ive lyc losed  and hence infinite data base. 
When a question such as "Does  Macdonalds pay taxes?" is asked, we 
need some means for generating an answer. One means might be ro 
take basic facts such as that Macdonalds is a restaurant and match them 
on the basis of their logical form with deductive rules such as universal 
instantiation: 
All A are B. 
x i s  A. 
Therefore ,  x is B. 
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Undoubtedly such a system could be designed. In the 1960's, especially, 
ingenious systems were designed which used deductive theorem prov- 
ing based on the method of resolution, wherein a theorem is proved by 
constructing derivations from the negation of the theorem expressed in 
conjunctive normal form (see, e.g., Nilsson 1971). Unfortunately, 
resolution theorem proving becomes impossibly slow when the number 
of facts in a database becomes more than a few (Barr and Feigenbaum 
198t~ p~468)~-A-combinatorial explosion occurs because there is no 
satisfactory way to prune the number of ways to combine facts to make 
inferences. 
Frame systems avoid this problem by not doing the usual sort of 
deduction at all. EAT derives the conclusion that Macdonalds pays 
taxes without explicitly using any deductive rule such as universal 
instantiation or modus ponens. Instead, it uses the LISP function 
already mentioned which directly searches the hierarchy of frames 
established by the A-KIND-OF slots. This has the same result as 
deductive inference of the traditional sort, but is considerably more 
economical in respect to processing. Similarly, great gains of efficiency 
accrue through IF-NEEDED procedural attachments and frame-based 
mechanisms for analogical inferences. 
These general procedural properties of frame systems show that 
frame systems really are importantly different from the logistic systems 
more familiar to philosophers. For computational purposes, knowledge 
organization of the sort found in frame systems seems to be needed. I 
shall now review some psychological studies which suggest that the 
human information processing system also employs some of the prin- 
ciples of organization found in frame systems. 
. 
If frame systems were only a device to make computers process 
information more efficiently, they would not necessarily be of any 
philosophical interest at all: why should an epistemologist be any more 
concerned with frames than with FORTRAN? The answer is that 
parallel with the developments about frames in AI have been empirical 
studies in cognitive psychology wich suggest that human thinking 
employs frame-like structures. H 
In cognitive psychology, frames are more commonly referred to as 
"schemas" or "schemata". Although intense discussion of schemas has 
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occurred only recently, the notion of a schema can be found in Bartlett 
(1932), and related notions occur in Head (1926) and Kant (1787). The 
psychological literature on schemas has become voluminous and 
diverse, and I shall not attempt to survey it. 121 will try, however, to give 
a succinct characterization of schemas, their frame-like properties, and 
the role they are claimed to play in human cognition. 
Whereas frames can be given a relatively exact characterization as 
structures in LISP, schemas are theoretical psychological entities 
postulated to explain a variety of observed phenomena of human 
cognition, so no exact definition is to be expected. Roughly, a schema is 
a large, complex unit of knowledge expressing what is typical of a group 
of instances. Whereas we had frames for both particular objects and 
general concepts, schemas, by the very nature of the term, involve 
some sort of abstraction and generalization. The RESTAURANT 
frame described above fits this definition, as it is more complex than a 
proposition and expresses in a nondefinitional way what is typical of 
restaurants. Schemas are posited to provide the same advantages to 
human cognition which frames provide to a computer. A set of schemas 
serves to generate a set of expectations, so that the thinker need not 
confront external information passively. Incoming information is pro- 
cessed by matching it with existing schemas, which immediately makes 
possible the utilization of information already acqunired. For example, 
recognizing something as a restaurant produces a set of expectations 
and possible inferences using procedural mechanisms such as in- 
heritance and defaults. Schemas, like frames, are presumably organized 
into macrostructures. 
A script (Schank and Abelson, 1977) is a frequently discussed kind of 
schema which describes a typical sequence of events. People generally 
expect events in a restaurant to occur in an order much like that 
described in the following structure, a frame in EAT: 
(RESTAURANT-SCRIPT 
(FIRST (VALUE (ENTER)) ) 
(THEN 1 (DEFAULT (BE-GREETED)) ) 
(THEN 2 (DEFAULT (BE-SEATED)) ) 
(THEN 3 (DEFAULT (ORDER-DRINKS)) ) 
(THEN 4 (DEFAULT ORDER-FOOD) ) ) 
(THEN 5 (DEFAULT (EAT)) ) 
(THEN 6 (DEFAULT (PAY-BILL)) ) 
(LAST (VALUE (LEAVE)) ) ) 
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You would be very surprised if food were brought to you before you 
had ordered it, or if you were in a standard full-service restaurant and 
were asked to pay immediately after ordering. The restaurant script has 
other scripts embedded within it, and is itself embedded in the general 
frame or schema for restaurant. 
Other examples of areas in which schemas have been thought to be 
psychologically important include category terms such as bird, and 
social stereotypes such as Irish. A schema for bird would differ from a 
conceptual analysis providing necessary and sufficient conditions: the 
point of a schema is not to define what properties belong to all and only 
birds, but to list properties typical of birds. Thus, a schema for bird 
would likely contain the default information that birds fly. The schema 
for the stereotypical Irishman might include a default for being 
Catholic. Obviously, there are potential costs as well as benefits in the 
use of schemas in reasoning, since error can result from careless use of 
default values. 
The existence of such errors in human reasoning is one of the sorts of 
evidence which researchers have used to support claims for the 
psychological reality of schemas. In Brewer and Treyens (1981), 
subjects were asked to recall what items were in a university office in 
which they had been kept waiting. They often made the mistake of 
"recalling" that there were books in the office, even though there were 
none. Having a schema for university office which included a default 
for the presence of books would explain their error. 
Schemas also affect the speed with which items can be recalled from 
memory. It should be easier to recall events which instantiate schemas 
and thereby are more easily accessed. There is a mounting list of results 
which support the view that the human processing system employs 
something like schemas to facilitate encoding and recall of information. 
Schemata have been postulated to have important functions in percep- 
tion, discourse understanding, learning, remembering, and problem 
solving.13 Although schema theory is by no means universally accepted, 
the wealth of empirical applications which have been found for it 
provides at least a presumption that the human information processing 
system uses framelike structures. 
Because schemas are theoretical entities, the relation between 
schemas and propositions is more difficult to discuss than the relation 
between frames and sentences in predicate calculus. Schemas are 
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psychological entities, and there are grave problems in saying just what 
their structure is, how many of them there are, and how they are used. 
Of course, there are also great difficulties, both philosophical and 
psychological, in saying what a proposition is (see, for example, Gale, 
1967). In the foreseeable course of empirical inquiry, there does not 
seem to be an experimental way of determining whether schemas have 
propositions as constituents. Nevertheless, the schema notion clearly 
has significance independent of the issue of whether schemas are 
constituted of propositions, since even if they are, they nevertheless 
have important emergent procedural properties. The schema, as a 
whole, plays a role in information processing which cannot be ascribed 
to unconnected, unorganized sets of propositions. Hence, despite the 
vagueness of the notion of a schema, there are empirical and concep- 
tual reasons for supposing that schemas go beyond the propositional 
knowledge structures usually discussed by philosophers. 
Although the question of whether schemas have propositional com- 
ponents is not at present empirically answerable, it is not without 
theoretical interest. We should at least leave open the possibility that 
the human "language of thought" is organized rather differently from a 
natural language. After all, other animals besides humans, as well as 
human infants, perform complex tasks without the benefit of knowledge 
of natural language (Churchland 1979). Moreover, the basic structure 
of the frames discussed above is apparently not propositional, even 
though the slots could be translated into propositions with subject and 
predicate. 
My claim about the possible nonpropositional nature of schemas will 
be more plausible to psychologists if it is made clear that I am using 
"proposition" in a sense closer to that common in philosophy than to 
that common in psychology. The rough meaning of the term in 
philosophy is that which is expressed by a declarative sentence. Since 
frames do not contain declarative sentences, slots being verbless, it is 
tempting to  say that they are nonpropositional. In contrast, the term in 
psychological investigations such as those of John Anderson (1981) 
usually means a relational structure of nodes in a processing system. 
The psychological notion of proposition is already a procedural one, 
whereas the philosophical notion only becomes procedural when some 
processing system is adduced. 
Another  argument for not considering schemas to be mere sets of 
F R A M E S ,  K N O W L E D G E ,  A N D  I N F E R E N C E  247 
propositions is based on the nature of propositions. Propositions are 
often said to be constructed out of concepts, but what is a concept? The 
proposition that restaurants serve food is constructed, perhaps, out of 
the concepts of a restaurant, serving, and food, But what, in psy- 
chological terms, is the concept of a restaurant if not the restaurant 
schema? Thus it seems at least as legitimate to say that the components 
of propositions are schemas as it does to say that the components of 
schemas are propositions. 
Problems remain, particularly concerning the actual size and struc- 
ture of schemas. In an artificial frame system, we can have a large 
number of discreet, complex frames, identifiable by reading the code of 
the program defining them. In contrast, speculation about the human 
schema system is open to all sorts of construals of what goes into a 
schema. Original work on scripts (Schank and Abelson, 1977) assumed 
that scripts such as the one for eating in a restaurant were fairly rigid 
structures, playing a unitary role in processing. More recently, empiri- 
cal and theoretical discussions have suggested that such structures do 
not exist in memory precompiled, but must be constructed from smaller 
knowledge structures (Bower, Black & Turner, 1979; Schank, 1979, 
1980). Schemas therefore appear to be more fluid and flexible than 
frames. They can nevertheless play the important roles in cognition 
described above. TM 
Before proceeding to epistemology, I should make a terminological 
note. In the cognitive science literature, "frame" and "schema" are 
sometimes used interchangeably. I have adopted the policy of using 
"schema" for the rather vague psychological notion, reserving "frame" 
for the much more precise structure in LISP described above. For 
epistemological analysis, the precise frame notion is the appropriate 
one, although it must be kept in mind that the epistemological 
significance of frames depends on their being idealizations of schemas. 
. 
If frames do play an important role in cognition they are potentially of 
epistemological significance. This follows from the position of weak 
psychologism defended above in Section 1: if logic is to be prescriptive 
about mental processes, we must at least know what mental processes to 
be prescriptive about. Construing our knowledge as structured in frame 
systems has many interesting epistemological implications, but only two 
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kinds of consequences will be discussed. In this section I shall argue that 
the construal of knowledge as structured in procedurally oriented frame 
systems suggests an alternative view of inference and alteration of 
knowledge which has methodological conservatism as an ineluctable 
result. Then in section 4 1 argue that default reasoning introduces novel 
epistemological issues, and that potential problems of inconsistency are 
easily handled in a frame system by procedural means. 
According to the familiar philosophical view sketched at the begin- 
ning of section 1, knowledge (or, if you prefer, belief) is structured as a 
set of propositions, which changes by addition to and deletion from the 
set by means of inference based on other members of the set. In 
contrast, frame theory suggests that the growth of knowledge in an 
individual must be understood as involving the incorporation of a 
complex congnitive system, not simply a set of propositions. Experts 
and novices may have the same set of explicit beliefs about a domain, 
i.e., they would assent to the same sentences, yet have very different 
abilities to handle information in that domain. Chi, Feltovich and 
Glaser (1981) report important differences in the ways in which physics 
problems are represented by experienced and beginning physicists. 
Whereas novices categorize problems by surface structure, experts are 
able to map a problem into a richer set of problem schemas with 
attached procedures. Chi et al. found that whereas novices tend to 
categorize:physics problems in terms of types of physical objects, 
experts tend to classify problems in terms of the major physics principle 
governing the solution of each problem. Moreover, experts associate 
these principles with procedural knowledge about their applicability. In 
frame terminology, we would say that the experts had acquired a frame 
system which included frames for kinds of problems as well as associate 
procedures for solving those problems. To know an area of physics, 
then, is to have incorporated a very complex structure over which one 
has little or no conscious control. 
This has a clear consequence for the question of conservatism in 
science. Consider the Kuhn-Popper debate over the attitudes of 
scientists toward their theories or paradigms (Kuhn, 1970a, 1970b; 
Popper, 1970). Popper maintains that it is a mark of scientific rationality 
that scientists be readily prepared to abandon their conjectures when 
they encounter experimental disconfirmation. Kuhn presents an image 
of a scientist as tenaciously retaining a familiar paradigm in the face of 
difficulties which are treated as mere puzzles to be solved using the 
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paradigm. A paradigm is abandoned only when a more powerful 
paradigm becomes available. As a description of the history of science, 
Kuhn's account can easily be shown to be superior to Popper's, but 
what of the normative issue: should scientists be as conservative as 
Kuhn describes? 
If a theory is a complex frame system, then it would seem that we 
have little choice in the matter. Unlike a propositional conjecture, a 
frame system is not easily abandoned. If learning a theory requires 
adoption of a whole network of frames for solving problems and 
handling the flow of information, then there is very great utility 
attached to its retention, over which, in any case, we do not have 
voluntary control. It becomes fully understandable why a scientist 
would not abandon a fertile way of thinking in the face of a few 
anomalies, and why it is a prerequisite for abandoment that a new 
paradigm (frame system) becomes available. Prescription about what 
revisions a person ought to make in his or her belief system therefore 
must take into account the difference between accepting or rejecting a 
proposition, on the one hand, and acquiring or supplanting a frame 
system on the other. 
Accepting a proposition is analogous to adding a slot and value to a 
frame, and rejecting a proposition corresponds to deleting a slot and 
value. But adding an entire frame is n o t  the same as accepting a set of 
propositions. A new frame must be integrated with existing knowledge 
by establishing its place in the processing system: new information is 
useless until procedural connections with existing frames are in place. 
Once a complex frame system such as that needed for solving physics 
problems is functioning as a whole, piecemeal revision becomes prob- 
lematic. 
Sklar (1975, p. 378) has discussed the following principle of 
methodological conservatism: 
If you believe some proposition, on the basis of whatever positive warrant may accrue to 
it from the evidence, a priori plausibility, and so forth, it is unreasonable to cease to 
believe the proposition to be true merely because of the existence of, or knowledge of, 
alternative incompatible hypotheses whose positive warrant is no greater than that of the 
proposition already believed. 
An analogous principle for frame systems might be something like: 
If you have a frame system for a domain, it is unreasonable to give it up merely because 
there is an available plausible alternative frame system. 
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This principle derives its support from two considerations. First, 
because ought implies can, we cannot be enjoined to abandon a frame 
system if it is not possible for us to do so. We cannot reprogram 
ourselves: the construction and alteration of frame systems is not within 
our conscious control. We have no direct access to the structures and 
processes which guide our thinking. Hence it is not reasonable to 
expect someone to suspend use of a processing system just because an 
alternative exists. Second, even if it were possible, it appears that there 
are empirical grounds for viewing the abandoment of a functioning 
frame system as undesirable. For by and large it is better to have s o m e  
elaborate system for processing information than none at all. To 
abandon a frame system for a domain is to be left with no categories for 
approaching problems in the domain, so that thought grinds to a halt. 
The rational strategy to adopt when one learns of the existence of a 
plausible alternative conceptual system to one's own is to attempt to 
learn the system in much the same way as its proponents have done. 
This is difficult, because of interference from the frames already in 
place. However, if one does succeed in developing the alternative 
frame system in parallel with one's original one, then rational choice of 
the second over the first becomes possible. Criteria can establish one 
frame system as a better explanation of the facts (Thagard 1978, 
forthcoming-ST). A new, whole frame system can then assume the 
procedural role of the previous system. But it is neither possible nor 
desirable to abandon an old way of understanding a domain until an 
alternative is in place. 
I am not saying that the two competing frame systems need be so 
incommensurable that no overlap exists. My point is just that for a 
processing system to be effective it must be systematically inter- 
connected by procedural mechanisms, in this case for interrelating 
frames. A modest holism, holding that piecemeal revision of isolated 
frames is difficult, immediately follows. Although it might be possible to 
revise a knowledge system by altering particular slots, significant 
revisions, affecting whole frames, will necessarily affect other frames 
because of essential procedural interconnections. To take a trivial 
example, if you altered the frame system EAT by removing the 
RESTAURANT frame, the hierarchical connection between MAC- 
DONALDS and BUSINESS would be broken, and important in- 
ferences would be blocked. 
The conservatism and holism which follow from the frame theoretic 
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approach can be compared to similar views of W. V. O. Quine. Quine 
(1953, 1960; Quine and Ullian 1970) has suggested several powerful 
metaphors for the structure of knowledge: Science is a web of belief, a 
connected fabric of sentences which face the tribunal of sense 
experience collectively, all susceptible to revision and adjustment like 
the planks of a boat  at sea. Part of the power of these metaphors is that 
they help lead us away from the standard view that knowledge consists 
in discrete sentences, confirmed and contenfful in isolation. Rather,  
knowledge forms an interconnected whole. But Quine's metaphors do 
not take us far enough. How is a set of sentences connected by more 
than deductive relations? How do we juggle an interconnected set of 
sentences so as to come up with the best total account? Frame systems 
offer a much richer description of the interconnections of what we 
know, a description which follows the basic insight of Quine's holism 
that we do not infer sentences in isolation, but which moreover  
organizes our knowledge topically and dynamically in a psychologically 
realistic way. Richness comes through adoption of a procedural  view- 
point and abandonment  of the fabric of sentences in favor of more 
complex cognitive structures and operations. The  web of belief does 
not consist of beliefs, but of frames and procedures for using them. 
. 
Let  us now look at those procedures in finer detail. In this section I want 
to discuss the epistemology of default reasoning and a procedural  
approach to the inconsistencies which can arise from default reasoning. 
In such reasoning, we infer that an object  has a certain property in the 
absence of any information to the contrary. E A T ,  for example, infers 
that a restaurant is in Ann Arbor  unless it is specifically told that the 
restaurant is located elsewhere. From a normative standpoint, the use of 
default values seems at first glance outrageous, since it will not 
infrequently lead the inferrer to a false conclusion, as when subjects in 
the office experiment described above reported the presence of nonex- 
istent books. Yet from a procedural  standpoint, default values have 
such utility that their proneness to error  does not warrant their 
proscription. Many processing tasks are done under time pressure and it 
can often be desirable to have a quick, approximate answer to a 
question than to wait a long time for a more reliable one. Accepting 
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default values also leaves one time to attend to more important matters. 
Designing an inference system such as EAT raises normative ques- 
tions quite unlike those usually discussed by epistemologists, since one 
has to decide what sort of priority is to be given to different sorts of 
inference. For example, the system can be set up to employ default 
values at an early stage in generating an answer to a question, or to 
defer the use of default reasoning until all other kinds of reasoning, 
using inheritance, procedural attachment, and analogy, have been 
performed. It is an interesting empirical question at what point in the 
process of inference human beings actually employ default values; and 
it is a challenging normative question at what levels of processing the 
different sorts of reasoning should be applied. To answer this question, 
we need more information about what revisions in order of processing 
we are capable of, and about the efficacy of different processing 
strategies in different circumstances. 
Default reasoning is superseded once an actual value for a slot is 
provided. Accordingly, such reasoning is said to be nonmonotonic, 
meaning that addition of new information does not simply add to the 
total of existing conclusions, but requires the revision of previous 
conclusions. There is much discussion of nonmonotonic reasoning in 
AI today,16 but the nonmonotonicity of inductive reasoning, as opposed 
to theorem derivation in deductive systems, is no news to philosophers. 
To take just one well-known case, a theory may be judged to be ac- 
ceptable on the basis of existing data, but the addition of new negative 
data may necessitate the rejection of the theory. 
What would happen if default reasoning gave one answer to a 
question while other kinds of reasoning produced a contradictory 
answer? That is, what happens if the frame system is inconsistent? The 
question is of general interest, since it has been argued (Campbell 1981, 
Routley 1979) that inconsistency in our knowledge system may be 
natural and unavoidable. I shall now argue that a procedural perspec- 
tive implies that we need not be terribly worried about inconsistencies. 
On the traditional philosophical view, logical contradictions are 
disastrous because the presence of both p and not-p in a set of 
propositions would entail that the set contained every proposition, since 
any proposition can be derived deductively from a contradiction. To 
deal with contradictions logistically, we need to take a logically radical 
step such as that recommended by Routley (1979), who advocates a 
nonstandard "dialectical" logic based on relevance logic, which does 
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not permit the derivation of just any proposition from a contradiction. 
Such radical revision of our logical principles is unnecessary, since 
contradictions can be dealt with procedurally. Instead of restricting 
what may be inferred, which is what revision of basic logic does, we 
instead make procedural restrictions on what as a matter of fact does 
get inferred. Such restrictions follow naturally from the point discussed 
above that the danger of combinatorial explosion precludes deductive 
closure. 
Any real processing system with limited resources must be judicious 
in what inferences it makes, and it is easy to see how a frame system 
could handle the presence of a contradiction. First, the effects of a 
contradiction could be localized within a particular macrostructure. 
The modular character of cognitive processes allows you to have a 
serious contradiction in your political beliefs, for example, while having 
no difficulty in dealing with grocery shopping. Your R E S T A U R A N T  
macrostructure might contain the information that all fast-food res- 
taurants are cheap, that Saco-Taco is a fast-food restaurant, but that 
Saco-Taco is expensive, without this contradictory information having 
an adverse effect on the system in general. Inferences need not resonate 
throughout the processing system, and indeed it would be com- 
putationally disastrous if they did so. Second, even within a particular 
macrostructure, what is believed need not be deductively closed. Rules 
of inference tell us only what we may infer, not what we must infer 
(Thagard, 1979). A frame based processing system could easily have a 
mechanism for suspending the production of new inferences when a 
contradiction occurs. Thus, the presence of a contradiction need not be 
epistemologically disastrous. That is, with appropriate procedural con- 
straints in place, it is quite possible to have a contradictory set of beliefs 
without destroying the general efficacy of the system. 17 
This is not to say that contradictions are especially valuable. The 
significance of inconsistencies is dynamic: 18 discovering that we believe 
both p and not-p is not an occasion for going on an inferring spree or 
for concluding that we are irrational, but it does signal that critical 
revision is in order. By critical revision, I do not mean merely 
adjustment in our set of propositions believed and not believed, but the 
more fundamental task of frame system adjustment. As we saw above, 
this is not a voluntary act: we cannot intentionally adjust a frame system 
any more than we voluntarily decide what to believe (Goldman 1978). 
But we can pursue information and investigation which will have the 
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desired effect of revision of the system. Revision may be as simple as 
replacement of a single slot in a single frame, or, as in the case of 
theories, it may involve reconstruction of entire macrostructures. 
. 
To many epistemologists, it might seem that the present emphasis on 
procedural matters has abandoned traditional concerns with 
justification and truth, It might be charged that frames are relevant only 
to systems design, not to the theory of knowledge. I would reply that if 
epistemology is construed, as I urged earlier, as the theory of the 
structure and growth of human knowledge, psychological and pro- 
cedural questions are unavoidable. In Thagard (1982a) I develop a 
methodology for determining the relevance of descriptive, psychologi- 
cal matters to normative, logical matters. This methodology is an 
alternative both to a priori, foundationalist approaches to logic, and to 
approaches which see the justification of logical principles to derive 
from some kind of reflective equilibrium between inferential principles 
and inferential practice (Goodman, 1965; Stich and Nisbett 1980). A 
logical principle is justified, on my account, if it is part of the best 
available inferential system, where an inferential system includes in 
addition to the set of normative principles, a set of descriptions of 
general inferential practice, a set of inferential goals, and a set of 
background psychological theories about the capacities of the inferrer. 
One of the criteria for selecting the best inference system is how 
successfully a set of principles enables an inferrer to meet his or her 
inferential goals given his or her capacities. If, ex hypothesi, the human 
information processing system is akin to a frame system, then the 
capacities and limitations which accompany such systems must be taken 
into account when judging what inferential principles to adopt. Ques- 
tions of justification therefore can be raised from a procedural per- 
spective, such as that provided by frame theory. 
This paper is only a brief introduction to the epistemology of frame 
systems (see further Thagard forthcoming-ST). ! have tried to charac- 
terize the notions of a frame and a frame system as clearly as possible, 
and ! have described implications of frame theory for two important 
epistemological questions, Of course, it could turn out as an empirical 
matter that the human information processing system is not a frame 
system, At present, however, frame-like knowledge representations 
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provide arguably the most attractive program for work in cognitive 
psychology and artificial intelligence. I have tried to show that 
philosophers concerned with epistemology and logic may also gain 
from concern with knowledge structures. 
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1 This AI use of "knowledge" will seem odd to philosophers for whom questions of 
knowledge are intimately connected with truth and justification. It would be closer to 
standard philosophical usage to say that AI is concerned with the representation of belief. 
However, this is also misleading since beliefs are usually taken to be atomistic and 
propositional, and it is a matter of debate whether our representational scheme should be. 
I will therefore stick with the AI terms "knowledge structure" and "knowledge 
representation", noting that these terms do not assume that the representations in 
question are veridical or justified. 
2 This is obviously a caricature of what I see as the dominant view, and does not take into 
account such conflicting views as those of Quineans who eschew talk of propositions in 
favor of sentences, or Bayesians and Popperians who resist the suggestion of the 
acceptance of propositions. 
3 For further arguments, see Haack (1975). 
4 Kindred attempts include the naturalistic epistemology of Quine (1968), the evolu- 
tionary epistemology of Campbell (1974), and the epistemics of Goldman (1978). 
s But there are dissenters to this claim. See for example Nilsson (1983). 
6 My account of frames is based on Winston and Horn (1981), chap. 22, which in turn is 
based on the frame representation language FRL: see Roberts and Goldstein (1977) and 
Goldstein and Roberts (1979). Other useful discussions include Charniak (1977), Bobrow 
and Winograd (1977, 1979), various essays in Bobrow and Collins (1975), Schank and 
Abelson (1977), Moore and Newell (1973), and, of course, Minsky (1975). It should be 
noted that philosophical antecedents of the frame notion can be found in such thinkers as 
Kant, Hegel, Hussefl, Heidegger, Wittgenstein, and Kuhn. 
7 The presence of defaults makes possible a kind of concept formation different from the 
standard methods of definition and abstraction from experience. For a frame-based 
account of conceptual combination, see Thagard (1984). 
8 Frame systems share this feature with semantic networks; see, for example, Norman and 
Rumelhart, 1975, and Anderson and Bower, 1973. 
9 For much more sophisticated discussion of the uses of frames in analogical reasoning, 
see Winston (1978, 1980) and Gick and Holyoak (1980). 
1o EXPLORE, a program which uses a frame representation similar to that in EAT, 
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performs more sophisticated kinds of inference including inductive generalization 
(Thagard forthcoming-RV). Thagard and Nisbett (1982) argue that confirmation of 
generalizations by their instances is in part a function of background knowledge about the 
variability of the kinds of things concerned. EXPLORE uses A-KIND-OF and IN- 
STANCES slots to make variability judgements which are critical for generalization. 
11 There are also analogous notions in linguistics: see Fillmore (1975) and Chafe (1976). 
Concern with knowledge structures is one of the most important strands uniting the new 
interdisciplinary field of "Cognitive Science". For a discussion of the relevance of 
artificial intelligence and psychology to philosophy of science see Thagard (1983). 
12 Useful surveys include Rumelhart (1980), Anderson (1980), chap. 5; and Hastie 
(1981). 
13 In addition to references already cited, see: Bower, Black, and Turner (1979); 
Thorndyke and Hayes-Roth (1979); Cantor and Mischel (1979); Lichtenstein and Brewer 
(1980); Abelson (1981); Chi et al. (1981). This list makes no pretense of comprehensive- 
hess. 
14 For a notion of schema which combines the advantages of frames with the flexibility 
found in rule-based systems, see Holland, Holyoak, Nisbett, and Thagard (forthcoming). 
15 See also Thagard (forthcoming-ST). 
16 See the articles in the special issue on nonmonotonic reasoning in Artificial In- 
telligence, 13, 1980. 
17 For arguments that we should sometimes judge people to be systematically in- 
consistent, see Thagard and Nisbett (1983). 
18 Similarly, Hegel sometimes explicitly embraced logical contradictions, but his primary 
concern was the process by which knowledge develops. Routley's "dialectical" logic fails 
to capture Hegel's complex dynamic notion of negation. See Thagard (1982b). 
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